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Abstract We study the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria, expressed as the
price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial,
multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial
auctions where m all-pay auctions run in parallel, one for each good. For fraction-
ally subadditive valuations, we strengthen the upper bound from 2 [23] to 1.82
by proving some structural properties that characterize the mixed Nash equilibria
of the game. Next, we design an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation
rule for the multi-unit auction. We show that, for bidders with submodular val-
uations, the mechanism admits a unique, 75% efficient, pure Nash equilibrium.
The efficiency of this mechanism outperforms all the known bounds on the price
of anarchy of mixed Nash equilibria in mechanisms used for multi-unit auctions.
Finally, we analyze single-item all-pay auctions motivated by their connection to
contests and show tight bounds on the price of anarchy with respect to social
welfare, revenue and maximum bid.
Keywords Nash equilibrium · Price of anarchy · All-pay auction
1 Introduction
It is a common economic phenomenon in competitions that agents make irre-
versible investments without knowing the outcome. All-pay auctions are widely
used in economics to capture such situations, where all players, even the losers,
pay their bids. For example, a lobbyist can make a monetary contribution in or-
der to influence decisions made by the government. Usually the group invested
the most increases their winning chances, but all groups have to pay regardless of
the outcome. In addition, all-pay auctions have been shown useful to model rent
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seeking, political campaigns and R&D races. There is a well-known connection
between all-pay auctions and contests [21]. In particular, the all-pay auction can
be viewed as a single-prize contest, where the payments correspond to the effort
that players make in order to win the competition.
In this paper, we study the efficiency of mixed Nash equilibria in all-pay auc-
tions with complete information, from a worst-case analysis perspective, using the
price of anarchy [16] as a measure. As social objective, we consider the social wel-
fare, i.e. the sum of the bidders’ valuations. We study the equilibria induced from
all-pay mechanisms in three fundamental resource allocation scenarios; combina-
torial auctions, multi-unit auctions and single-item auctions.
In a combinatorial auction, a set of items are allocated to a group of selfish
individuals. Each player has different preferences for different subsets of the items
and this is expressed via a valuation set function. A multi-unit auction can be
considered as an important special case, where there are multiple copies of a single
good. Hence the valuations of the players are not set functions, but depend only on
the number of copies received. Multi-unit auctions have been extensively studied
since the seminal work by Vickrey [24]. As already mentioned, all-pay auctions
have received a lot of attention for the case of a single item, as they model all-pay
contests and procurements via contests.
1.1 Contribution
Combinatorial Auctions. Our first result is on the price of anarchy of simultaneous
all-pay auctions with item-bidding that was previously studied by Syrgkanis and
Tardos [23]. For fractionally subadditive valuations, it was previously shown that
the price of anarchy was at most 2 [23] and at least e/(e−1) ≈ 1.58 [8]. We narrow
further this gap, by improving the upper bound to 1.82. In order to obtain the
bound, we come up with several structural theorems that characterize mixed Nash
equilibria in simultaneous all-pay auctions.
Multi-unit Auctions. Our next result shows a novel use of all-pay mechanisms to the
multi-unit setting. We propose an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation
rule inspired by Kelly’s seminal proportional-share allocation mechanism [15]. We
show that this mechanism admits a unique, 75% efficient pure Nash equilibrium and
no other mixed Nash equilibria exist, when bidders’ valuations are submodular.
As a consequence, the price of anarchy of our mechanism outperforms all current
price of anarchy bounds of mixed Nash equilibria in prevalent multi-unit auctions
including uniform price auction [18] and discriminatory auction [14], where the
bound is e/(e− 1) ≈ 1.58.
Single-item Auctions. Finally, we study the efficiency of a single-prize contest that
can be modeled as a single-item all-pay auction. We show a tight bound on the
price of anarchy for mixed Nash equilibria which is approximately 1.185. By fol-
lowing previous study on the procurement via contest, we further study two other
standard objectives, revenue and maximum bid. We evaluate the performance of
all-pay auctions in the prior-free setting, i.e. no distribution over bidders’ valu-
ation is assumed. We show that both the revenue and the maximum bid of any
mixed Nash equilibrium are at least as high as v2/2, where v2 is the second high-
est valuation. In contrast, the revenue and the maximum bid in some mixed Nash
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equilibrium may be less than v2/2 when using reward structure other than allocat-
ing the entire reward to the highest bidder. This result coincides with the optimal
crowdsourcing contest developed in [6] for the setting with prior distributions. We
also show that in conventional procurements (modeled by first-price auctions), v2
is exactly the revenue and maximum bid in the worst equilibrium. So procurement
via all-pay contests is a 2-approximation to the conventional procurement in the
context of worst-case equilibria.
1.2 Related work
The inefficiency of Nash equilibria in auctions has been a well-known fact (see
e.g. [17]). Existence of efficient equilibria of simultaneous sealed bid auctions in
full information settings was first studied by Bikhchandani [3]. Christodoulou,
Kova´cs and Schapira [7] initiated the study of the (Bayesian) price of anarchy of
simultaneous auctions with item-bidding. Several variants have been studied since
then [2,12,10,11], as well as multi-unit auctions [14,18]. Recently, Feldman, Lucier
and Nisan showed that, in first-price single-item auctions, correlated equilibria are
always efficient and the price of anarchy of coarse equilibria is exactly e/(e− 1).
Syrgkanis and Tardos [23] proposed a general smoothness framework for several
types of mechanisms and applied it to settings with fractionally subadditive bidders
obtaining several upper bounds (e.g., first price auction, all-pay auction, and multi-
unit auction). Christodoulou et al. [8] constructed tight lower bounds for first-price
auctions and showed a tight price of anarchy bound of 2 for all-pay auctions with
subadditive valuations. Roughgarden [20] presented an elegant methodology to
provide price of anarchy lower bounds via a reduction from the hardness of the
underlying optimization problems.
All-pay auctions and contests have been studied extensively in economic the-
ory. Baye, Kovenock and de Vries [1], fully characterized the Nash equilibria in
single-item all-pay auction with complete information. The connection between
all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests was proposed in [9]. Chawla et al. [6]
studied the design of optimal crowdsourcing contest to optimize the maximum
bid in all-pay auctions when agents’ value are drawn from a specific distribution
independently.
2 Preliminaries
In a combinatorial auction, n players compete on m items. Every player (or bidder)
i ∈ [n] has a valuation function vi : {0, 1}m → R+ which is monotone and nor-
malized, that is, ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ [m], vi(S) ≤ vi(T ), and vi(∅) = 0. The outcome of the
auction is represented by a tuple of (X,p) where X = (X1, . . . , Xn) specifies the al-
location of items (Xi is the set of items allocated to player i) and p = (p1, . . . , pn)
specifies the buyers’ payments (pi is the payment of player i for the allocation
X). In the simultaneous item-bidding auction, every player i ∈ [n] submits a non-
negative bid bij for each item j ∈ [m]. The items are then allocated by independent
auctions, i.e. the allocation and payment rule for item j only depend on the play-
ers’ bids on item j. In a simultaneous all-pay auction the allocation and payment
for each player is determined as follows: each item j ∈ [m] is allocated to the
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bidder i∗ with the highest bid for that item, i.e. i∗ = arg maxi bij , and each bidder
i is charged an amount equal to pi =
∑
j∈[m] bij . It is worth mentioning that, for
any bidder profile, there always exists a tie-breaking rule such that mixed Nash
equilibria exist [22].
Definition 1 (Valuations) Let v : 2[m] → R be a valuation function. Then v is
called a) additive, if v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}); b) submodular, if v(S ∪T ) + v(S ∩T ) ≤
v(S) + v(T ); c) fractionally subadditive or XOS, if v is determined by a finite set
of additive valuations ξk such that v(S) = maxk ξk(S).
The classes of the above valuations are in increasing order of inclusion.
Multi-unit Auction. In a multi-unit auction, m copies of an item are sold to n
bidders. Here, bidder i ’s valuation is a function that depends on the number
of copies he gets. That is vi : {0, 1, . . . ,m} → R+ and it is non-decreasing and
normalized, with vi(0) = 0. We say a valuation vi is submodular, if it has non-
increasing marginal values, i.e. vi(s+ 1)− vi(s) ≥ vi(t+ 1)− vi(t) for all s ≤ t.
Nash equilibrium and price of anarchy. We use bi to denote a pure strategy of
player i which might be a single value or a vector, depending on the auction.
So, for the case of m simultaneous auctions, bi = (bi1, . . . , bim). We denote by
b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn) the strategies of all players except for i. Any
mixed strategy Bi of player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies.
For any profile of strategies, b = (b1, . . . , bn), X(b) denotes the allocation
under the strategy profile b. The valuation of player i for the allocation X(b) is
denoted by vi(X(b)) = vi(b). The utility ui of player i is defined as the difference
between her valuation and payment: ui(X(b)) = ui(b) = vi(b)− pi(b).
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium) A bidding profile b = (b1, . . . , bn) forms a
pure Nash equilibrium if for every player i and all bids b′i, ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i).
Similarly, a mixed bidding profile B = ×iBi is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for
all bids b′i and every player i, Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb−i∼B−i [ui(b′i,b−i)]. Clearly, any
pure Nash equilibrium is also a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Our global objective is to maximize the sum of the valuations of the play-
ers for their received allocations, i.e., to maximize the social welfare SW (X) =∑
i∈[n] vi(Xi). So O(v) = O = (O1, . . . , On) is an optimal allocation if SW (O) =
maxX SW (X). In Sect. 5, we also study two other objectives: the revenue, which
equals the sum of the payments,
∑
i pi, and the maximum payment, maxi bi. We
also refer to the maximum payment as the maximum bid.
Definition 3 (Price of anarchy) Let I be the set of all instances, i.e. I in-
cludes the instances for every set of bidders and items and any possible valuation
functions. The mixed price of anarchy, PoA, of a mechanism is defined as
PoA = max
I∈I
max
B∈E(I)
SW (O)
Eb∼B[SW (X(b))]
,
where E(I) is the class of mixed Nash equilibria for the instance I ∈ I. The pure
PoA is defined as above but restricted in the class of pure Nash equilibria.
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Let B = (B1, . . . , Bn) be a profile of mixed strategies. Given the profile B, we
fix the notation for the following cumulative distribution functions (CDF): Gij is
the CDF of the bid of player i for item j; Fj is the CDF of the highest bid for item
j and Fij is the CDF of the highest bid for item j if we exclude the bid of player i.
Observe that Fj =
∏
kGkj and Fij =
∏
k 6=iGkj . We also use ϕij(x) to denote the
probability that player i gets item j by bidding x. Then, ϕij(x) ≤ Fij(x). When
we refer to a single item, we may drop the index j. Whenever it is clear from the
context, we will use shorter notation for expectations, e.g. we use E[ui(b)] instead
of Eb∼B[ui(b)], or even SW (B) to denote Eb∼B[SW (X(b))].
3 Combinatorial Auctions
In this section we prove an upper bound of 1.82 for the mixed price of anarchy of
simultaneous all-pay auctions when bidders’ valuations are fractionally subaddi-
tive. This result improves over the previously known bound of 2 due to [23]. The
proof itself might be of independent interest because we develop several struc-
tural properties of the mixed Nash equilibria. We first state our main theorem
and present the key ingredients. Then we prove these ingredients in the following
subsections.
3.1 Proof Outline
Here we present a (very short) sketch of the proof highlights of the upper bound.
Theorem 1 The mixed PoA for simultaneous all-pay auctions with fractionally
subadditive bidders is at most 1.82.
Proof Sketch. We first illustrate the main ideas by focusing on a single item all-
pay auction. W.l.o.g. we assume bidder 1 has the highest valuation v1 among all
bidders. First we came up with the following two lower bounds on the social welfare
in equilibrium,
SW (B) ≥ A+
∫ v1−A
0
1− F (x)dx, SW (B) ≥
∫ v1−A
0
√
F (x)dx
where F (x) is the CDF of maxi{bi} and A = maxx{F1(x) · v1 − x}. Note that
F1(x) is the CDF of maxi6=1{bi}. The first inequality is derived from the existing
upper bound of 2 [23]. The proof of the second inequality is based on the structure
of mixed Nash equilibria in all-pay auctions. By definition, we have Fi(x) ·vi−x ≥
Fi(y) · vi − y if bidder i bids x in the Nash. By taking limits when y → x, we
have that 1/vi equals to the derivative of Fi at x. So SW (B) can be rewritten as∑
i
∫ v1
x
Fi(x)gi(x)
1
F ′i (x)
dx ≥ ∫ v1−A
x
∑
i
gi(x)∑
k 6=i
gk(x)
Gk(x)
by using Fi(x) =
∏
k 6=iGk(x).
Then we can adapt the following proposition to get the second lower bound for
SW (B).
Proposition 1 For any integer l ≥ 2, any positive real Gi ≤ 1 and positive real
gi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
l∑
i=1
gi∑
k 6=i
gk
Gk
≥
√√√√ l∏
i=1
Gi
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The bound 1.82 can be derived by an optimal convex combination of these two
lower bounds for SW (B). In order to generalize the proof from a single to multiple
items, we introduce a notion, that we call expected marginal valuation denoted by
vij(x) for which we show that Fij(x) ·vij(x)−x ≥ Fij(y) ·vij(x)−y. This allows us
to treat each item separately and get the improved upper bound for simultaneous
all-pay auctions.
3.2 Full Proof
Proof Given a valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn), let O = (O1, . . . , On) be a
fixed optimal solution that maximizes the social welfare. Since vi is a fractionally
subadditive valuation, let fOii be a maximizing additive function w.r.t Oi. Let
j ∈ Oi be one of the items that i receives. We denote by oj item j’s contribution
to the optimal social welfare, that is, oj = f
Oi
i (j). The optimal social welfare is
thus SW (O) =
∑
j oj . In order to bound the price of anarchy, we consider only
items with oj > 0, as it is without loss of generality to omit items with oj = 0.
For a fixed mixed Nash equilibrium B, recall that by Fj and Fij we denote the
CDFs of the maximum bid on item j among all bidders, with and without the bid
of bidder i, respectively. Observe that Fj(x) ≤ Fij(x). For any item j ∈ Oi, let
Aj = maxx≥0 {Fij(x)oj − x}.
As a key part of the proof we use the following two inequalities that bound
from below the social welfare in any mixed Nash equilibrium B.
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(1− Fj(x))dx) (1)
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√
Fj(x)dx (2)
Inequality (1), suffices to provide a weaker upper bound of 2 (see [8]). The
proof of Inequality (2) is much more involved, and requires deeper understanding
of the properties of equilibria of the induced game. We postpone their proofs to
Section 3.3 (Lemma 1) and Section 3.4 (Lemma 2) respectively.
By combining (1) and (2) we get
SW (B) ≥ 1
1 + λ
·
∑
j
(
Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(1− Fj(x))dx+ λ ·
∫ oj−Aj
0
√
Fj(x)dx
)
,
(3)
for any λ ≥ 0. It suffices to bound from below the right-hand side of (3) with
respect to the optimal social welfare. For any cumulative distribution function F ,
and any positive real number v, let
R(F, v)
def
= A+
∫ v−A
0
(1− F (x))dx+ λ ·
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx,
where A = maxx≥0{F (x)·v−x}. Then inequality (3) can be rewritten as SW (B) ≥
1
1+λ
∑
j R(Fj , oj). Finally, we show a lower bound on R(F, v) that holds for any
CDF F and any positive real v.
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R(F, v) ≥ 3 + 4λ− λ
4
6
· v. (4)
The proof of inequality 4 is given in Section 3.5 (Lemma 19). Finally, we obtain
that for any λ > 0,
SW (B) ≥ 1
1 + λ
∑
j
R(Fj , oj) ≥ 3 + 4λ− λ
4
6λ+ 6
·
∑
j
oj =
3 + 4λ− λ4
6λ+ 6
· SW (O)
We conclude that the price of anarchy is at most 6λ+63+4λ−λ4 ' 1.82 by taking
λ = 0.56. uunionsq
3.3 Proof of Inequality (1)
This section is devoted to the proof of the following lower bound.
Lemma 1 SW (B) ≥∑j∈[m](Aj + ∫ oj−Aj0 (1− Fj(x))dx).
Proof Recall that Aj = maxx≥0 {Fij(x)oj−x}. We can bound bidder i’s utility in
the Nash equilibrium B by ui(B) ≥
∑
j∈Oi Aj . To see this, consider the deviation
for bidder i, where he bids only for items in Oi, namely, for each item j, he bids
the value xj that maximizes the expression Fij(xj)oj −xj . Since for any obtained
subset T ⊆ Oi, he has value vi(T ) ≥
∑
j∈T oj , and the bids xj must be paid in any
case, the expected utility with these bids is at least
∑
j∈Oi maxx≥0 (Fij(x)oj−x) =∑
j∈Oi Aj . With B being an equilibrium, we infer that ui(B) ≥
∑
j∈Oi Aj .
By summing up over all bidders, we have
SW (B) =
∑
i∈[n]
ui(B) +
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ] ≥
∑
j∈[m]
Aj +
∑
j∈[m]
∑
i∈[n]
E[bij ]
≥
∑
j∈[m]
(Aj + E[max
i∈[n]
{bij}]) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(
Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(1− Fj(x))dx
)
.
The first equality holds because SW (B) =
∑
i Eb[vi(b)] =
∑
i Eb[ui(b) +∑
j∈[m] bij ]. The second inequality follows because
∑
i bij ≥ maxi bij and the last
one is implied by the definition of the expected value of any positive random
variable. uunionsq
3.4 Proof of Inequality (2)
In this section, we prove the following lemma for any mixed Nash equilibrium B.
Lemma 2 SW (B) ≥∑j∈[m] ∫ oj−Aj0 √Fj(x)dx.
First we show a useful lemma that holds for fractionally subadditive valuations.
Lemma 3 For any fractionally subadditive valuation function v,
v(S) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(v(S)− v(S \ {j})) .
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Proof Let f be a maximizing additive function of S for the fractionally subadditive
valuation v; then by definition v(S) = f(S) and for every item j it holds that
v(S \ {j}) ≥ f(S \ {j}). Then,∑
j∈[m]
(v(S)− v(S \ {j})) ≤
∑
j∈[m]
(f(S)− f(S \ {j})) =
∑
j∈S
f(j) = v(S).
uunionsq
We will use the following technical proposition.
Proposition 2 (restate Proposition 1) For any integer n ≥ 2, any positive reals
Gi ≤ 1 and positive reals gi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
i=1
gi∑
k 6=i
gk
Gk
≥
√√√√ n∏
i=1
Gi.
In order to prove the proposition, we will minimize the left hand side of the in-
equality over all Gi and gi, such that
0 < Gi ≤ 1 gi > 0 (i ∈ [n]) where
n∏
t=1
Gt is a constant. (5)
We introduce the following notation:
H =
n∑
i=1
gi∑n
t=1,t 6=i
gt
Gt
and ∀i, Hi = gi∑n
t=1,t 6=i
gt
Gt
.
Note that H =
∑n
i=1Hi. Our goal is to minimize H over all possible variables Gi
and gi under the constraints (5), and eventually show H ≥
√∏n
i=1Gi. We also
use the notation G = (Gi)i, g = (gi)i, H = H(G,g) and Hi = Hi(G,g), ∀i.
Lemma 4 For every G and g that minimize H(·, ·) under constraints (5):
1. If Gi < 1 and Gj < 1, then Hi = Hj ,
2. If Gi = Gj = 1 then gi = gj.
We prove Lemma 4, by proving Lemmas 5 and 6.
Lemma 5 Under constraints (5), if G and g minimize H(·, ·), then for every
Gi < 1 and Gj < 1, Hi(G,g) = Hj(G,g).
Proof For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exist Gi < 1 and Gj < 1
such that (w.l.o.g.) Hi(G,g) > Hj(G,g). Let
r = min
{(
Hi(G,g)
Hj(G,g)
) 1
2
,
1
Gj
}
.
Notice that r > 1.
Claim: We claim that H(G,g) > H(G′,g′), where G′ = (Gir , rGj ,G−ij) and
g′ = (gir , rgj ,g−ij).
As usual G−ij stands for G vector after eliminating Gi and Gj (accordingly for
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g−ij). Therefore G′ and g′ are the same as G and g by replacing Gi, Gj , gi, gj
by Gir , rGj ,
gi
r , rgj , respectively.
Proof of the claim: Notice that
g′i
G′i
=
gi/r
Gi/r
=
gi
Gi
,
g′j
G′j
=
rgj
rGj
=
gj
Gj
and ∀s 6= i, j, G′s = Gs and g′s = gs.
Therefore, ∀s 6= i, j, Hs(G,g) = Hs(G′,g′). So, we only need to show that
Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g) > Hi(G
′,g′) +Hj(G′,g′).
Hi(G
′,g′) +Hj(G′,g′)
=
g′i(x)∑n
t=1,t 6=i
g′t(x)
G′t(x)
+
g′j(x)∑n
t=1,t 6=j
g′t(x)
G′t(x)
=
gi(x)/r∑n
t=1,t 6=i
gt(x)
Gt(x)
+
rgj(x)∑n
t=1,t 6=j
gt(x)
Gt(x)
=
Hi(G,g)
r
+ rHj(G,g)
=
(
1
r
− 1
)
Hi(G,g) + (r − 1)Hj(G,g) +Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)
≤
(
1
r
− 1
)
r2Hj(G,g) + (r − 1)Hj(G,g) +Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)
= − (r − 1)2Hj(G,g) +Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)
< Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g).
In the above inequalities we used that r > 1 and r2 ≤ Hi(G,g)Hj(G,g) . The claim
contradicts the assumption that H(G,g) is the minimum, so the lemma holds.
uunionsq
Lemma 6 Under constraints (5), if G and g minimize H(·, ·), then for every
Gi = Gj = 1, gi = gj .
Proof For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exist Gi = Gj = 1 such
that gi 6= gj . We will prove that for g′ = (gi+gj2 , gi+gj2 , g−ij) (i.e. for every k 6= i, j,
g′k = gk, and g
′
i = g
′
j =
gi+gj
2 ), H(G,g) > H(G,g
′).
Notice that for every k 6= i, j, Hk(G,g′) = Hk(G,g), since gi + gj = g′i + g′j
and Gi = Gj = 1. Hence it is sufficient to show that Hi(G,g) + Hj(G,g) ≥
Hi(G,g
′) +Hj(G,g′). Let Aij =
∑
t 6=j,t 6=i
gt
Gt
.
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Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)−Hi(G,g′)−Hj(G,g′)
=
gi
gj +Aij
+
gj
gi +Aij
− gigi+gj
2 +Aij
− gjgi+gj
2 +Aij
=
gi
gj +Aij
+
gj
gi +Aij
− 2gi + 2gj
gi + gj + 2Aij
= gi
(gi +Aij)((gi + gj + 2Aij)− 2(gj +Aij))
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
+ gj
(gj +Aij)((gi + gj + 2Aij)− 2(gi +Aij))
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
=
gi(gi +Aij)(gi − gj) + gj(gj +Aij)(gj − gi)
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
=
(gi − gj)(g2i − g2j +Aij(gi − gj))
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
=
(gi − gj)2(gi + gj +Aij)
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
> 0,
which contradicts the assumption that G and g minimize H(·, ·). uunionsq
Lemma 7 If Hi = Hj, then:
1. gi = gj ⇔ Gi = Gj,
2. (gi = rgj > 0 and r ≥ 1)⇒ Gi ≥ r2Gj.
Proof Let Aij =
∑
t 6=j,t 6=i
gt
Gt
; then Hi =
gi
gj
Gj
+Aij
. By assumption:
gi
gj
Gj
+Aij
=
gj
gi
Gi
+Aij
g2i
Gi
+ giAij =
g2j
Gj
+ gjAij
(gi − gj)Aij = g
2
j
Gj
− g
2
i
Gi
.
If gi = gj then
1
Gj
− 1Gi = 0, so Gi = Gj .
If Gi = Gj then (gi − gj)(gi + gj +AijGi) = 0 . Under constraints (5), AijGi > 0
and gi, gj > 0, so gi − gj = 0 which results in gi = gj .
If gi = rgj , with r ≥ 1 then (gi − gj)Aij ≥ 0 and so 1Gj − r
2
Gi
≥ 0, which implies
Gi ≥ r2Gj . uunionsq
Lemma 8 For n, k integers, n ≥ 2, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, 0 < a ≤ 1 and g > 0:
L =
kg
(k − 1) ga + n− k
+
n− k
k ga + n− k − 1
≥ a.
Proof We distinguish between two cases, 1) k > 1
1−√a and 2) k ≤ 11−√a .
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Case 1 (k > 1
1−√a ): For k = n, L =
k
k−1a ≥ a. We next show that dLdg ≤ 0, for
n ≥ 2, 1 ≤ k < n, 0 < a ≤ 1 and g > 0.
dL
dg
=
(n− k)k(
(k−1)g
a + n− k
)2 − (n− k)k(
kg
a + n− k − 1
)2
a
≤ 0
(
(k − 1)g
a
+ n− k
)2
−
(
kg
a
+ n− k − 1
)2
a ≥ 0(
(k − 1)g
a
+ n− k −
(
kg
a
+ n− k − 1
)
a
1
2
)
≥ 0(g
a
(
k − 1− ka 12
)
+ (n− k)
(
1− a 12
)
+ a
1
2
)
≥ 0
k − 1− ka 12 ≥ 0
which is true by the case assumption. Therefore, L is non-increasing and so it is
minimized for g =∞. Hence, L ≥ kk−1a ≥ a.
Case 2 (k ≤ 1
1−√a ): L is minimized (dL/dg(g
∗) = 0) for g∗ =
a(
√
a+(n−k)(1−√a))
k
√
a−k+1 ,
therefore:
L ≥
k2 (1−√a)2 + k
(
a− n (1−√a)2 − 1
)
+ n)
(n− 1) ,
which is minimizes for k = n2 +
(1+
√
a)
2(1−√a) . However, for n ≥ 2,
n
2 +
(1+
√
a)
2(1−√a) ≥
1
1−√a . Notice, though, that for k ≤ 11−√a , L is decreasing, so it is minimized for
k = 1
1−√a . Therefore, L ≥
√
a ≥ a.
uunionsq
Proof (Proposition 1)
Let G and g minimize H(·, ·) and also let S = {i|Gi < 1} and F =
∏n
t=1Gt.
Moreover, given Lemma 4, for gi = gˆ for every i /∈ S and j = arg mini∈S gi,
H(G,g) can be written as:
H(G,g) = |S| gj∑
t∈S,t 6=j
gt
Gt
+ (n− |S|)gˆ + (n− |S|)
gˆ∑
t∈S
gt
Gt
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ .
Let gi = rigj , for every i ∈ S. Since j = arg mini∈S gi, then for every i ∈ S, ri ≥ 1.
By using Lemma 7:
H(G,g) = |S| gj∑
t∈S,t 6=j
rtgj
G
1
2
t G
1
2
t
+ (n− |S|)gˆ + (n− |S|)
gˆ∑
t∈S
rtgj
G
1
2
t G
1
2
t
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ
≥ |S| gj∑
t∈S,t 6=j
gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S|)gˆ + (n− |S|)
gˆ∑
t∈S
gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ
= |S| gj
(|S| − 1) gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S|)gˆ + (n− |S|)
gˆ
|S| gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ .
Let g =
gj
gˆ , then:
H(G,g) ≥ |S|g
(|S| − 1) g
F
1
2
+ n− |S| +
n− |S|
|S| g
F
1
2
+ n− |S| − 1 .
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If |S| = 0, H(G,g) ≥ nn−1 ≥ 1 ≥
√
F . else, due to Lemma 8, H(G,g) ≥ √F .
uunionsq
We are now ready to proceed with the proof of Lemma 2. Recall that oj is
the contribution of item j to the optimum social welfare. If player i is the one
receiving item j in the optimum allocation, then Aj = maxx≥0{Fij(x) · oj − x}.
The proof of Lemma 2 needs a careful technical preparation that we divided into
a couple of lemmas.
First of all, we define the expected marginal valuation of item j for player i.
For given mixed strategy Bi, the distribution of bids on items in [m]\{j} depends
on the bid bij , so one can consider the given conditional expectation:
Definition 4 Given a mixed bidding profile B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn), the expected
marginal valuation vij(x) of item j for player i when bij = x is defined as
vij(x)
def
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x].
For a given B, let ϕij(x) denote the probability that bidder i gets item j when she
bids x on item j. It is clear that ϕij is non-decreasing and ϕij(x) ≤ Fij(x) (they
are equal when no ties occur).
Lemma 9 For a given B, for any bidder i, item j and bids x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0,
ϕij(y) · vij(x) = E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x],
where b′ is the modified bid of b such that b′ = b except that b′ij = y.
Proof
E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x]
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)]Pr(j ∈ Xi(b′)|bij = x)
+ E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j /∈ Xi(b′)]Pr(j /∈ Xi(b′)|bij = x)
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)]Pr(j ∈ Xi(b′)|bij = x)
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)] · ϕij(y)
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)] · ϕij(y)
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x] · ϕij(y)
= ϕij(y) · vij(x).
The second equality is due to Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′))) − vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j /∈
Xi(b
′)] = 0; the third one holds because b′ij = y, and that other players’ bids
have distribution ×k 6=iBk. The fourth one is obvious, since Xi(b′) = Xi(b′)∪{j}
given that j ∈ Xi(b′). The last two equalities follow from the fact that vi(Xi(b′)∪
{j})−vi(Xi(b′)\{j}) is independent of the condition j ∈ Xi(b′) and of the player
i’s bid on item j. uunionsq
Definition 5 Given a Nash equilibrium B, we say a bid x is good for bidder i and
item j (or bij = x is good) if E[ui(b)] = E[ui(b)|bij = x], otherwise we say bij = x
is bad.
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Lemma 10 Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i and item j, Pr[bij is bad] =
0.
Proof The lemma follows from the definition of Nash equilibrium; otherwise we
can replace the bad bids with good bids and improve the bidder’s utility. uunionsq
Lemma 11 Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i, item j, good bid x and
any bid y ≥ 0,
ϕij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ ϕij(y) · vij(x)− y.
Moreover, for a good bid x > 0, ϕij(x) > 0 holds.
Proof Let b′ be the modified bid of b such that b′ = b except that b′ij = y.
E[ui(b)] = E[ui(b)|bij = x] ≥ E[ui(b′)|bij = x].
Now we consider the difference between the above two terms:
0 ≤ E[ui(b)|bij = x]− E[ui(b′)|bij = x]
= E[vi(Xi(b))− bij |bij = x]− E[vi(Xi(b′))− b′ij |bij = x]
= E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x]− E[vi(Xi(b′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j}|bij = x] + y − x
= (ϕij(x) · vij(x)− x)− (ϕij(y) · vij(x)− y).
The second equality holds since Xi(b) \ {j} = Xi(b′) \ {j}; the third equality
holds by Lemma 9.
Finally, ϕij(x) > 0 for positive good bids follows by taking y = 0, since with
ϕij(x) = 0 the left hand side of the inequality would be negative. uunionsq
Next, by using the above lemma, we are able to show several structural results for
Nash equilibria.
Definition 6 Given a mixed strategy profile B, we say that a positive bid x > 0
is in bidder i’s support on item j, if for all ε > 0, Gij(x)−Gij(x− ε) > 0.
Lemma 12 Given a mixed strategy profile B, if a positive bid x is in bidder i’s
support on item j, then for every ε > 0, there exists x − ε < x′ ≤ x such that x′
is good.
Proof Suppose on the contrary that there is an ε > 0 such that for all x′, such
that x − ε < x′ ≤ x, x′ is bad. Then Pr[bij is bad] ≥ Gij(x) − Gij(x − ε) > 0
(given that x is in the support), which contradicts Lemma 10. uunionsq
Lemma 13 Given a Nash equilibrium B, if x > 0 is in bidder i’s support on item
j, then there must exist another bidder k 6= i such that x is also in the bidder k’s
support on item j, i.e. for all ε > 0, Gkj(x)−Gkj(x− ε) > 0.
Proof Assume on the contrary that for each player k 6= i, there exists εk > 0
such that Gkj(x)−Gkj(x− εk) = 0. Clearly, for ε = min{εk|k 6= i} it holds that
Gkj(x) − Gkj(x − ε) = 0 for all bidders k 6= i. That is ϕij(x) = ϕij(x − ε). By
Lemma 12, there exists x− ε < x′ ≤ x such that x′ is good for player i. Since ϕij
is a non-decreasing function and ϕij(x) = ϕij(x−ε), we have ϕij(x′) = ϕij(x−ε).
By Lemma 11, ϕij(x
′) · vij(x′)−x′ ≥ ϕij(x− ε) · vij(x′)−x+ ε which contradicts
the fact that ϕij(x
′) = ϕij(x− ε) and x′ > x− ε. uunionsq
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Lemma 14 Given a Nash equilibrium B, for bidder i and item j, there are no
x > 0 such that Pr[bij = x] > 0, i.e. there are no mass points in the bidding
strategy, except for possibly 0.
Proof Assume on the contrary that there exists a bid x > 0 such that Pr[bij =
x] > 0 for some bidder i and item j. By Lemma 10, x is good for bidder i and
item j, and ϕij(x) > 0 by Lemma 11.
According to Lemma 13, there must exist a bidder k such that x is in her
support on item j. We can pick a sufficiently small ε such that ε < (x−ε) ·ϕij(x) ·
Pr[bij = x]. This can be done since (x − ε) increases when ε decreases. Due to
Lemma 12 there exists x− ε < x′ ≤ x such that x′ is good for bidder k and item
j. Now we consider the following two cases for x′.
Case 1: vkj(x
′) ≤ x′. Then ϕkj(x′) · vkj(x′) − x′ ≤ ϕkj(x′) · x′ − x′ ≤ (1 −
ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x]) · x′ − x′ < 0, contradicting Lemma 11. The first inequality
holds by the case assumption. The second holds because player k cannot get item
j with bid x′ whenever player i gets it by bidding x. The last inequality holds
because both ϕij(x) > 0 and Pr[bij = x] > 0.
Case 2: vkj(x
′) > x′. Then there exists a sufficiently small ε′ such that ε′ ≤
(x− ε) · ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x]− ε. So ε+ ε′ ≤ x′ · ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x]. Then,
ϕkj(x+ ε
′) · vkj(x′)− x− ε′
≥(ϕkj(x′) + ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x]) · vkj(x′)− x− ε′
>ϕkj(x
′) · vkj(x′) + ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x] · x′ − x′ − (x− x′)− ε′
>ϕkj(x
′) · vkj(x′) + ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x] · x′ − x′ − ε− ε′
≥ϕkj(x′) · vkj(x′)− x′,
which contradicts Lemma 11. Here the first inequality holds because the proba-
bility that player k gets the item with bid x+ ε′ is at least the probablity that he
gets it by bidding x′ plus the probability that i bids x and gets the item (these
two events for b−k are disjoint). The second inequality holds by case assumption,
and the rest hold by our assumptions on ε and ε′. uunionsq
Lemma 15 Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i and item j, ϕij(x) =
Fij(x) for all x > 0.
Proof The lemma follows immediately from Lemma 14. The probablity that some
player k 6= i bids exactly x is zero. Thus Fij(x) equals the probability that the
highest bid of players other than i is strictly smaller than x, and 1− Fij(x) is the
probability that it is strictly higher. Therefore ϕij(x) = Fij(x). uunionsq
Lemma 16 Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i, item j and good bids
x1 > x2 > 0, vij(x1) ≥ vij(x2).
Proof By Lemma 11, we have (ϕij(x1)−ϕij(x2))·vij(x1) ≥ x1−x2 and (ϕij(x2)−
ϕij(x1)) · vij(x2) ≥ x2 − x1. Combining these two inequalities, we have
1
vij(x1)
≤ ϕij(x1)− ϕij(x2)
x1 − x2 ≤
1
vij(x2)
.
uunionsq
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Lemma 17 Given a Nash equilibrium B and item j, let T = sup{x|x is in some
bidder’s support on item j}. For any bid x < T , x is in some bidder’s support on
item j.
Proof Assume on the contrary that there exist a bid x < T such that x is not in
any bidder’s support. Then there exists δ > 0 such that Gij(x) = Gij(x−δ) for all
bidder i. Let y = sup{z|∀i, Gij(x) = Gij(z)}. By Lemma 14, Gij is continuous. So
we have Gij(y) = Gij(x) = Gij(x−δ) for any bidder i. That is Fij(y) = Fij(x−δ)
for any bidder i.
By the definition of supremum, there exists a bidder k such that for any ε > 0,
Gkj(y+ε) > Gkj(x) = Gkj(y). By Lemma 10, there exists a good bid y
+ ∈ (y, y+ε]
for bidder k and item j. We pick a sufficiently small ε such that (Fkj(y
+)−Fkj(y))·
vkj(y
+) < δ. This can be done since Fkj is continuous by Lemma 14 and vkj is
non-decreasing by Lemma 16.
Fkj(x− δ) · vij(y+)− x+ δ
=Fij(y) · vij(y+)− x+ δ
>Fij(y) · vij(y+)− y+ + δ
>Fij(y
+) · vij(y+)− y+,
which contradicts Lemma 11 and Lemma 15. uunionsq
Lemma 18 Given a Nash equilibrium B, if x > 0 is a good bid for bidder i and
item j, and Fij is differentiable in x, then
1
vij(x)
=
dFij(x)
dx
.
Proof Notice that vij(x) 6= 0 by Lemma 11. By Lemma 11 and 15, we have
Fij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ Fij(y) · vij(x)− y for all y ≥ 0. So for any ε > 0,
Fij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ Fij(x+ ε) · vij(x)− x− ε
Fij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ Fij(x− ε) · vij(x)− x+ ε.
That is,
Fij(x+ ε)− Fij(x)
ε
≤ 1
vij(x)
,
Fij(x)− Fij(x− ε)
ε
≥ 1
vij(x)
.
The lemma follows by taking the limit when ε goes to 0. uunionsq
Proof [Proof of Lemma 2] Since Gij(x) is non-decreasing, continuous (Lemma
14) and bounded by 1, Gij(x) is differentiable on almost all points. That is, the
set of all non-differentiable points has Lebesgue measure 0. So it will not change
the value of integration if we remove these points. Therefore it is without loss of
generality to assume Gij(x) is differentiable for all x. Let gij(x) be the derivative
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of Gij(x), i.e. probability density function for bidder i’s bidding on item j. Using
Lemma 3, we have
SW (B) =
∑
i
E[vi(Xi(b))]
≥
∑
i
∑
j
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})]
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] · gij(x)dx
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x)dx.
The second inequality follows by the law of total probability, and the third is
due to Lemmas 9 and 15. By Lemma 18 and the fact that Fij(x) =
∏
k 6=iGkj(x),
if x is good, gij(x) > 0 and Gij(x) > 0 we have for all j
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) =Fij(x) · gij(x)dFij
dx (x)
=
∏
k 6=iGkj(x) · gij(x)∑
k 6=i
(
gkj ·
∏
s 6=k∧s6=iGsj
) = gij(x)∑
k 6=i
gkj(x)
Gkj(x)
.
By concentrating on a specific item j, let Sx be the set of bidders so that x
is in their support. We next show that |Sx| ≥ 2 for all x ∈ (0, oj − Aj ]. Recall
that Aj = maxx {Fij(x) · oj − x} for the bidder i who receives j in O. Let hij =
min{x|Fij = 1} (we use minimum instead of infimum, since, by Lemma 14, Fij
is continuous). By definition hij should be in some bidder’s support. Moreover,
Aj ≥ Fij(hij) ·oj−hij = oj−hij , resulting in oj−Aj ≤ hij . Therefore, by Lemma
17, for all x ∈ (0, oj −Aj ], x is in some bidder’s support and by Lemma 13, there
are at least 2 bidders such that x is in their supports.
By the definition of derivative, for all i 6∈ Sx, gij(x) = 0. Similarly, we have
gij(x) > 0 and Gij(x) > 0 for all i ∈ Sx by definition 6. Moreover, for every
i ∈ Sx, x is good for bidder i and item j, since x is in their support. So, for any
fixed x ∈ (0, oj −Aj ],
∑
i∈[n] Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) =
∑
i∈Sx Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x),
and according to Proposition 1,
∑
i∈[n]
Fij(x)·vij(x)·gij(x) ≥
∑
i∈Sx
gij(x)∑
k 6=i,k∈Sx
gkj
Gkj
≥
√∏
i∈Sx
Gij(x) ≥
√∏
i∈[n]
Gij(x).
Merging all these inequalities,
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√∏
i∈[n]
Gij(x)dx =
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√
Fj(x)dx.
uunionsq
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3.5 Proof of Inequality (4)
In this section we prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma 19 For any CDF F and any real v > 0, R(F, v) ≥ 3+4λ−λ46 v.
In order to obtain a lower bound for R(F, v) as stated in the lemma, we show
first that we can restrict attention to cumulative distribution functions of a simple
special form, since these constitute worst cases for R(F, v). In the next lemma,
for an arbitrary CDF F we will define a simple piecewise linear function Fˆ that
satisfies the following two properties.
∫ v−A
0
(1−Fˆ (x))dx =
∫ v−A
0
(1−F (x))dx and
∫ v−A
0
√
Fˆ (x)dx ≤
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx.
Once we establish this, it will be convenient to lower bound R(Fˆ , v) for the
given type of piecewise linear functions Fˆ .
Lemma 20 For any CDF F and real v > 0, there always exists another CDF Fˆ
such that R(F, v) ≥ R(Fˆ , v) that is defined by
Fˆ (x) =
{
0 if x ∈ [0, x0]
x+A
v if x ∈ (x0, v −A]
where A = maxx≥0{F (x) · v − x}.
Proof First notice that maxx≥0{Fˆ (x) · v − x} = A. By the definition of Riemann
integration, we can represent the integration as the limit of Riemann sums. For any
positive integer l, let Rl be the Riemann sum if we partition the interval [0, v−A]
into small intervals of size (v −A)/l. That is
Rl(F, v) = A+
v −A
l
·
(
l−1∑
i=0
(1− F (xi)) + λ ·
l−1∑
i=0
√
F (xi)
)
where xi =
i
l · (v −A). So we have R(F, v) = liml→∞Rl(F, v).
For any given l, let i∗ be the index such that
∑
i>i∗(xi + A)/v <
∑l−1
i=0 F (xi)
and
∑
i>=i∗(xi +A)/v ≥
∑l−1
i=0 F (xi). We define Fˆl as follows.
Fˆl(x) =

0 if x < xi∗∑l−1
i=0 F (xi)−
∑
i>i∗(xi +A)/v if x ∈ [xi∗ , xi∗+1)
(x+A)/v if x ∈ [xi∗+1, v −A]
It is straight-forward to check that Fˆ (x) = liml→∞ Fˆl(x), as described in the
statement of the lemma. We will show that for any l, Rl(F, v) ≥ Rl(Fˆl, v). Then
the lemma follows by taking the limit, since Rl(F, v) → R(F, v), and Rl(Fˆ , v) →
R(Fˆ , v). Figure 1(a) illustrates Fˆ (x) (when we take the limit of l to infinity).
By the construction of Fˆl, it is easy to check that
∑l−1
i=0 F (xi) =
∑l−1
i=0 Fˆl(xi)
and maxx{Fˆl(x) · v − x} = A. Then in order to prove Rl(F, v) ≥ Rl(Fˆl, v), it is
sufficient to prove that
∑l−1
i=0
√
F (xi) ≥
∑l−1
i=0
√
Fˆl(xi). Let Q be the set of CDF
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1 Figure (a) illustrates Fˆ (x) = liml→∞ Fˆl(x) and figure (b) shows how Q′ is derived
from Q.
functions such that ∀Q ∈ Q, ∑l−1i=0Q(xi) = ∑l−1i=0 F (xi) and A = maxx≥0{Q(x) ·
v − x}, meaning further that Q(x) ≤ (x + A)/v, for all x ≥ 0. We will show that
Fˆl(x) has the minimum value for the expression
∑l−1
i=0
√
Fˆl(xi) within Q.
Assume on the contrary that some other function Q ∈ Q has the minimum
value for
∑l−1
i=0
√
Q(xi) within Q and Q(xj) 6= Fˆl(xj) for some xj . Let i1 be
the smallest index such that Q(xi1) > 0 and i2 be the largest index such that
Q(xi2) < (xi2 + A)/v. By the monotonicity of Q, we have i1 ≤ i2. Due to the
assumption that Q(xj) 6= Fˆl(xj) for some xj and
∑l−1
i=0
√
Q(xi) ≤
∑l−1
i=0
√
Fˆl(xi),
we get i1 6= i2. So i1 < i2 and Q(xi1) < Q(xi2) by the monotonicity of CDF
functions. Now consider another CDF function Q′ such that Q′(xi) = Q(xi) for
all i 6= i1 ∧ i 6= i2, Q′(xi1) = Q(xi1) −  and Q′(xi2) = Q(xi2) +  where  =
min{Q(xi1), (xi2 +A)/v −Q(xi2)}. Figure 1(b) shows how we modify Q to Q′. It
is easy to check Q′ ∈ Q and ∑l−1i=0√Q(xi) >∑l−1i=0√Q′(xi) which contradicts the
optimality of Q. The inequality holds because of
√
a+
√
b >
√
a− c+√b+ c for
all 0 < c < a < b, which can be proved by simple calculations. uunionsq
Now we are ready to proceed with the proof of Lemma 19.
Proof [Proof of Lemma 19] By Lemma 20, for any fixed v > 0, we only need to
consider the CDF’s that have the following form. For any positive A and x0 such
that x0 +A ≤ v,
F (x) =
{
0 if x ∈ [0, x0]
x+A
v if x ∈ (x0, v −A]
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Clearly, maxx≥0{F (x) · v − x} = A. Let t = A+x0v . Then
R(F, v) = A+
∫ v−A
0
1− F (x)dx+ λ ·
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx
= v − v
2
·
(
x+A
v
)2 ∣∣∣∣v−A
x0
+ λ · 2v
3
·
(
x+A
v
) 3
2
∣∣∣∣v−A
x0
= v − v
2
· (1− t2) + λ · 2v
3
· (1− t 32 )
= v ·
(
1
2
(1 + t2) +
2λ
3
(1− t 32 )
)
By optimizing over t, the above formula is minimized when t = λ2 ≤ 1. That is,
R(F, v) ≥ v ·
(
1
2
(1 + λ4) +
2λ
3
(1− λ3)
)
=
3 + 4λ− λ4
6
· v
uunionsq
4 Multi-unit Auctions
In this section, we propose a randomized all-pay mechanism for the multi-unit
setting, where m identical items are to be allocated to n bidders. Markakis and
Telelis [18] and de Keijzer et al. [14] have studied the price of anarchy for several
multi-unit auction formats. The current best upper bound obtained was 1.58 for
mixed Nash equilibria.
We propose a randomized all-pay mechanism that induces a unique pure Nash
equilibrium, with an improved price of pnarchy bound of 4/3. We call the mech-
anism Random proportional-share allocation mechanism (PAM), as it is a ran-
domized version of Kelly’s celebrated proportional-share allocation mechanism for
divisible resources [15]. The mechanism works as follows (illustrated as Mecha-
nism 1).
Each bidder submits a non-negative real bi to the auctioneer. After soliciting
all the bids from the bidders, the auctioneer associates a real number xi with
bidder i that is equal to xi =
m·bi∑
i∈[n] bi
. Each player pays their bid, pi = bi. In the
degenerate case, where
∑
i bi = 0, then xi = 0 and pi = 0 for all i.
Mechanism 1: Random PAM
Input: Total number of items m and all bidders’ bid b1, b2, . . . , bn
Output: Ex-post allocations X1, X2, . . . , Xn and payments p1, p2, . . . , pn
if
∑
i∈[n] bi > 0 then
foreach bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
xi ← m·bi∑
i∈[n] bi
;
pi ← bi;
Sample {Xi}i∈[n] from {xi}i∈[n] by using Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition theorem
such that bxic ≤ X ≤ dxie and the expectation of sampling Xi is xi;
else Set X = 0 and p = 0 ;
Return Xi and pi for all i ∈ [n];
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We turn the xi’s to a random allocation as follows. Each bidder i secures
bxic items and gets one more item with probability xi − bxic. An application of
the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition theorem [4] guarantees that given an
allocation vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with
∑
i xi = m, one can always find a random-
ized allocation1 with random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn such that E[Xi] = xi and
Pr[bxic ≤ Xi ≤ dxie] = 1.
We next show that the game induced by the Random PAM when the bid-
ders have submodular valuations is isomorphic to the game induced by Kelly’s
mechanism for a single divisible resource when bidders have piece-wise linear con-
cave valuations. For convenience, we review the definition of isomorphism between
games as appears in Monderer and Shapley [19].
Definition 7 [19]. Let Γ1 and Γ2 be games in strategic form with the same set of
players [n]. For k = 1, 2, let (Aik)i∈[n] be the strategy sets in Γk, and let (u
i
k)i∈[n]
be the utility functions in Γk. We say that Γ1 and Γ2 are isomorphic if there
exists bijections φi : ai1 → ai2, i ∈ [n] such that for every i ∈ [n] and every
(a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ ×i∈[n]Ai1,
ui1(a
1, a2, . . . , an) = ui2(φ
1(a1), φ2(a2), . . . , φn(an)).
Theorem 2 Any game induced by the Random PAM applied to the multi-unit
setting with submodular bidders is isomorphic to a game induced from Kelly’s
mechanism applied to a single divisible resource with piece-wise linear concave
functions.
Proof For each bidder i’s submodular valuation function fi : {0, 1, . . . ,m} → R+,
we associate a concave function gi : [0, 1]→ R+ such that,
for every x ∈ [0,m], gi(x/m) = fi(bxc) + (x− bxc) · (fi(bxc+ 1)− fi(bxc)).(6)
Essentially, gi is the piecewise linear function that comprises the line segments
that connect fi(k) with fi(k + 1), for all nonnegative integers k. It is easy to see
that gi is concave if fi is submodular (see also Figure 4 for an illustration).
We use identity functions as the bijections φi of Definition 7. Therefore, it
suffices to show that, for any pure strategy profile b, ui(b) = u
′
i(b), where ui and
u′i are the bidder i’s utility functions in the first and second game, respectively.
Let xi =
m·bi∑
i bi
, then
ui(b) = (xi − bxic)fi(bxic+ 1) + (1− xi + bxic)fi(bxic)− bi
= fi(bxic) + (xi − bxic)(fi(bxic+ 1)− fi(bxic))− bi
= gi
(xi
m
)
− bi = gi
(
bi∑
i bi
)
− bi = u′i(b),
where gi
(
bi∑
i bi
)
− bi is the utility of player i, under strategy profile b, in Kelly’s
mechanism. uunionsq
Given submodular functions (fi)i, let (gi)i be the associated concave functions
as defined in (6). We can show the following equivalence between optimal welfares.
1 As an example, assume x1 = 2.5, x2 = 1.6, x3 = 1.9. One can define a random allocation
such that assignments (3, 2, 1), (3, 1, 2) and (2, 2, 2) occur with probabilities 0.1, 0.4, and 0.5
respectively.
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Fig. 2 Illustration of the concave function.
The left part of the figure depicts some submodular function f , while the right part depicts
the modified concave function g. One can verify that g is concave if f is submodular.
Lemma 21 The optimum social welfare in the multi-unit setting, with submodular
valuations f = (f1, . . . , fn), is equal to the optimal social welfare in the divisible
resource allocation with concave valuations g = (g1, . . . gn), where g is derived
from f as described in (6).
Proof For any valuation profile v and (randomized) allocation A, we denote by
SWv(A) the social welfare of allocation A under the valuations v. For any frac-
tional allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn), such that
∑
i xi = m, let X(x) = (X1(x), . . . , Xn(x))
be the random allocation as computed by the Random PAM given the fractional
allocation x. Also let o = (o1, . . . , on) and O = (O1, . . . , On) be the optimal allo-
cations in the divisible resource allocation problem and in the multi-unit auction,
respectively.
First we show that SWg(o) ≥ SWf (O). Consider the fractional allocation
o′ = (o′1, . . . , o
′
n), where o
′
i = Oi/m, for every i. Then it is easy to see that for
every i, gi(o
′
i) = fi(bOic) + (Oi − bOic) · (fi(bOic+ 1)− fi(bOic)) = fi(Oi), since
Oi is an integer. Therefore, SWg(o) ≥ SWg(o′) = SWf (O), by the optimality of
o.
Now we show SWf (O) ≥ SWg(o). Note that for any fractional allocation
x, such that
∑
j xj = m, EX(x)[fi(Xi(x))] = fi(bxic) + (xi − bxic) · (fi(bxic +
1) − fi(bxic)) = gi(xi/m), for every i. By the optimality of O, SWf (O) ≥
EX(m·o)[SWf (X(m · o))] = SWg(o). uunionsq
Theorem 2 and Lemma 21, allow us to obtain the existence and uniqueness of
the pure Nash equilibrium, as well as the price of anarchy bounds of Random PAM
by the corresponing results on Kelly’s mechanism for a single divisible resource
[13]. Moreover, it can be shown that there are no other mixed Nash equilibria by
adopting the arguments of [5] for Kelly’s mechanism. The main conclusion of this
section is summarized in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Random PAM induces a unique pure Nash equilibrium when applied
to the multi-unit setting with submodular bidders. Moreover, the price of anarchy
of the mechanism is exactly 4/3.
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5 Single item auctions
In this section, we study mixed Nash equilibria in a single item all-pay auction.
First, in Section 5.1 we measure the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria, showing
tight results for the price of anarchy. Then in Section 5.2, we analyze the quality
of two other important criteria, the expected revenue (the sum of bids) and the
quality of the expected highest submission (the maximum bid), which is a standard
objective in crowdsourcing contests [6]. For these objectives, we show a lower bound
of v2/2, where v2 is the second highest value among all bidders’ valuations. In the
following, we drop the word expected while referring to the revenue or to the
maximum bid.
We quantify the loss of revenue and the highest submission in the worst-case
equilibria. We show that the all-pay auction achieves a 2-approximation compar-
ing to the conventional procurement (modeled as the first price auction), when
considering worst-case mixed Nash equilibria; we show in Section 5.3 that the rev-
enue and the maximum bid of the conventional procurement equals v2 in the worst
case. We also consider other structures of rewards allocation and conclude that
allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder is the only way to guarantee the
approximation factor of 2. Roughly speaking, allocating all the reward to the top
prize is the optimal way to maximize the maximum bid and revenue among all the
prior-free all-pay mechanisms where the designer has no prior information about
the participants’ skills.
Throughout this section we assume that the players are ordered based on de-
creasing order of their valuations, i.e. v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn.
5.1 Social Welfare
Our analysis is based on the characterization of the Nash equilibrium with single
item by [1]. En route, we also show the price of anarchy is 8/7 for auctions with
two players.
Theorem 3 The mixed price of anarchy of single item all-pay auction is at most
1.185.
Proof Based on the results of [1], inefficient Nash equilibria only exist when players’
valuations are in the form v1 > v2 = ... = vk > vk+1 ≥ ... ≥ vn (with v2 > 0),
where players k+1 through n bid zero with probability 1. W.l.o.g., we assume that
v1 = 1 and vi = v > 0, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Let P1 be the probability that bidder 1 gets
the item in any such mixed Nash equilibrium denoted by B. Then the expected
utility of bidder 1 in b ∼ B can be expressed by E[u1(b)] = P1 ·1−E[b1]. Based on
the characterization in [1], no player would bid above v in any Nash equilibrium and
nobody bids exactly v with positive probability. Therefore, if player 1 deviates to
v, she will gets the item with probability 1. By the definition of Nash equilibrium,
we have E[u1(b)] ≥ E[u1(v,b−i)] = 1− v, resulting in P1 ≥ 1− v + E[b1].
It has been shown in the proof of Theorem 2C in [1], that E[b1] is minimized
when players 2 through k play symmetric strategies. Following their results, we
can extract the following equations (for a specific player i):
G1(x) =
x
v
∏
i′ 6=1,iGi′(x)
, ∀x ∈ (0, v],
∏
i′ 6=1
Gi′(x) = 1−v+x, ∀x ∈ (0, v]
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recall that Gi′(x) is the CDF according to which player i
′ bids in B. Since players
2 through k play symmetric strategies, Gi′(x) should be identical for i
′ 6= 1. Then,
for some i′ 6= 1,
G1(x) =
x
v ·Gk−2i′ (x)
=
x
v · (1− v + x) k−2k−1
, ∀x ∈ (0, v]
Note that 1 − v + x ≤ 1, and so we get G1(x) ≤ xv(1−v+x) (for two players,
G1(x) =
x
v ) and
E[b1] ≥
∫ v
0
(
1− x
v (1− v + x)
)
dx = v − 1− (1− v) ln(1− v)
v
.
Now we can derive that P1 ≥ 1−vv ln 11−v . For two players, E[b1] =
∫ v
0
(1− x/v) dx =
v/2 and so P1 = 1− v/2.
The expected social welfare in B is E[SW (b)] ≥ P1+(1−P1)v ≥ (1−v)
2
v ln
1
1−v+
v. The expression, T (v) = (1−v)
2
v ln
1
1−v + v, is minimized for v ≈ 0.5694 and
therefore, the price of anarchy is at most T (0.5694) ≈ 1.185. Particularly, for two
players, E[SW (b)] ≥ 1− v/2 + v2/2, which is minimized for v = 1/2 and therefore
the price of anarchy for two players is at most 8/7. uunionsq
Theorem 4 The mixed price of anarchy of single item all-pay auction is at least
1.185.
Proof Consider n players, with valuations v1 = 1 and vi = v > 0, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let B be the Nash equilibrium, where bidders bid according to the following CDFs,
G1(x) =
x
v (1− v + x)n−2n−1
x ∈ [0, v], Gi(x) = (1− v + x)
1
n−1 x ∈ [0, v], i 6= 1
Note that Fi(x) =
∏
i′ 6=iGi′(x) is the probability of bidder i getting the item when
she bids x, for every bidder i.
F1(x) = (1− v + x) x ∈ [0, v], Fi(x) = x
v
x ∈ [0, v], i 6= 1.
If player 1 bids any value x ∈ [0, v], her utility is u1 = F1(x) · 1 − x = 1 − v.
Bidding greater than v is dominated by bidding v. If any player i 6= 1 bids any
value x ∈ [0, v], her utility is ui = Fi(x) · v− x = 0. Bidding greater than v results
in negative utility. Hence, B is a Nash equilibrium. Let P1 be the probability that
bidder 1 gets the item in B, then
E[SW (b)] = 1 · P1 + (1− P1)v = v + (1− v)P1 = v + (1− v)
∫ v
0
Gn−1i (x)dG1(x).
When n goes to infinity, E[SW (b)] converges to v + (1 − v) ∫ v
0
1−v
v(1−v+x)dx =
v + (1− v)1−vv ln 11−v = (1−v)
2
v ln
1
1−v + v = T (v). If we set v = 0.5694, the price
of anarchy is at least T (v) ≈ 1.185.
For n = 2, E[SW (b)] = v+(1−v) ∫ v
0
1−v+x
v = v+(1−v)(1−v/2) = 1−v/2+v2/2,
which for v = 1/2 results in price of anarchy at least 8/7. uunionsq
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5.2 Revenue and Maximum Bid
In this section we bound the revenue and the maximum bid of the single-item all-
pay auction, for the case of mixed Nash equilibria. Specifically, the revenue and
the maximum bid have value of at least v2/2 and this value goes to v2/2 when the
number of bidders goes to infinity and v2/v1 approaches 0.
Theorem 5 In any mixed Nash equilibrium of the single-item all-pay auction, the
revenue and the maximum bid are at least half of the second highest valuation.
Proof Let k be any integer greater or equal to 2, such that v1 ≥ v2 = . . . = vk ≥
vk+1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Let F (x) =
∏
iGi(x) be the CDF of the maximum bid h. By
the characterization of [1], in any mixed Nash equilibrium, players with valuation
less than v2 do not participate (always bid zero) and there exist two players 1, i
bidding continuously in the interval [0, v2]. Then, by [1], F1 = (v1 − v2 + x)/v1
and Fi(x) = x/v2, for any x ∈ (0, v2]. Therefore, we get
F (x) = Fi(x)Gi(x) =
x
v2
Gi(x).
In the proof of Theorem 2C in [1], it is argued that Gi1(x) is maximized (and
therefore the expected maximum bid is minimized) when all the k players play
symmetrically (except for the first player, in the case that v1 > v2). So, F (x) is
maximized for Gi =
(∏
i′ 6=1Gi′
) 1
k−1
= F
1
k−1
1 =
(
v1−v2+x
v1
) 1
k−1
. Finally we get
E[h] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))dx ≥
∫ v2
0
(
1− x
v2
(
v1 − v2 + x
v1
) 1
k−1
)
dx
≥ v2 −
∫ v2
0
x
v2
dx =
1
2
v2.
The same lower bound also holds for the expected revenue, which is at least
as high as the expected maximum bid. This lower bound is tight for the expected
maximum bid, as indicated by our analysis, when k goes to infinity and for the
symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium. In the next lemma, we show that this lower
bound is also tight for the expected revenue. uunionsq
Lemma 22 There exists a mixed Nash equilibrium of the single-item all-pay auc-
tion, where the revenue converges to v2/2 when the number of players goes to
infinity and v2/v1 approaches 0.
Proof In [1], the authors provide results for the revenue in all possible equilibria.
For the case that v1 = v2, the expected revenue is always equal to v2. To show a
tight lower bound, we consider the case where v1 > v2 and there exist k players
with valuation v2 playing symmetrically in the equilibrium, letting k go to infinity.
For this case, based on [1], the revenue is equal to2∑
i
E[bi] = v2 + (1− v)E[b1],
2 For simplicity we assume v1 = 1 and v2 = v.
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where, E[b1] =
∫ v
0
(1−G1(x)) dx. From the proof of Theorem 5 we can derive that
G1(x) = F (x)/F1(x) =
x
v (1− v + x)
1
k−1−1 = xv (1− v + x)−1, when k goes to
infinity. By substituting we get,∑
i
E[bi] = v2 + (1− v)
∫ v
0
(
1− x
v
(1− v + x)−1
)
dx
= v2 + (1− v)
(
v − 1
v
(v + (1− v) ln(1− v))
)
= 2v − 1− (1− v)
2
v
ln(1− v)
= v − (1− v)
(
1 +
1− v
v
ln(1− v)
)
.
By taking limits, we finally derive that limv→0
(∑
i E[bi]
v
)
= 1/2. uunionsq
Finally, the next theorem indicates that allocating the entire reward to the
highest bidder is the best choice. In particular a prior-free all-pay mechanism is
presented by a probability vector q = (qi)i∈[n], with
∑
i∈[n] qi = 1, where qi is the
probability that the ith highest bidder is allocated the item, for every i ≤ n.
Theorem 6 For any prior-free all-pay mechanism that assigns the item to the
highest bidder with probability strictly less than 1, i.e. q1 < 1, there exists a valu-
ation profile and mixed Nash equilibrium such that the revenue and the maximum
bid are strictly less than v2/2.
Proof We will assert the statement of the theorem for the valuation profile
(1, v, 0, 0, . . . , 0), where v ∈ (0, 1) is the second highest value. It is safe to as-
sume that q2 ∈ [0, q1) 3. We show that the following bidding profile is a mixed
Nash equilibrium. The first two bidders bid on the interval [0, v(q1 − q2)] and the
other bidders bid 0. The CDF of bidder 1’s bid is G1(x) =
x
v(q1−q2) and the CDF of
bidder 2’s bid is G2(x) = x/(q1−q2)+1−v. It can be checked that this is a mixed
Nash equilibrium by the following calculations. For every bid x ∈ [0, v(q1 − q2)],
u1(x) = G2(x) · q1 + (1−G2(x)) · q2 − x = q1 − v(q1 − q2)
u2(x) = G1(x) · q1v + (1−G1(x)) · q2v − x = q2v
The expected revenue is∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(1−G1(x))dx+
∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(1−G2(x))dx
=
∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(
1− x
v(q1 − q2)
)
dx+
∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(
1−
(
x
q1 − q2 + 1− v
))
dx
=
v(q1 − q2)
2
+
v2(q1 − q2)
2
When v goes to 0, the revenue go to v(q1 − q2)/2 < v/2 since q1 − q2 < 1.
Obviously, the same happens with the maximum bid, which is at most the same
as the revenue. uunionsq
3 Otherwise, consider the tie-breaking rule that allocates the item equiprobably. Then for
q2 ≥ q1, the strategy profile where all players bid zero is strictly dominant.
26 George Christodoulou et al.
5.3 Conventional Procurement
In this section we give bounds on the expected revenue and maximum bid of the
single-item first-price auction. In the following, we just write revenue and maxi-
mum bid instead of expected revenue and expected maximum bid, respectively.
Theorem 7 In any mixed Nash equilibrium, the revenue and the maximum bid lie
between the two highest valuations. There further exists a tie-breaking rule, such
that in the worst-case, these quantities match the second highest valuation (This
can also be achieved, under the no-overbidding assumption).
Lemma 23 In any mixed Nash equilibrium, if the expected utility of any player i
with valuation vi is 0, then with probability 1 the maximum bid is at least vi.
Proof Consider any mixed Nash equilibrium b ∼ B and let h = maxi{bi} be the
highest bid; h is a random variable induced by B. For the sake of contradiction,
assume that h is strictly less than vi with probability p > 0. Then, there exists
ε > 0 such that h < vi−ε with probability p. Consider now the deviation of player
i to pure strategy si = vi−ε. si would be the maximum bid with probability p and
therefore the utility of player i would be at least p(vi − (vi − ε)) = p · ε > 0. This
contradicts the fact that B is an equilibrium and completes the proof of lemma.
uunionsq
Lemma 24 In any mixed Nash equilibrium, if v is the highest valuation, any
player with valuation strictly less than v has expected utility equal to 0.
Proof In [8] (Theorem 5.4), they proved that the price of anarchy of mixed Nash
equilibria, for the single-item first-price auction, is exactly 1. This means that the
player(s) with the highest valuation gets the item with probability 1. Therefore,
any player with valuation strictly less than v gets the item with zero probability
and hence, her expected utility is 0. uunionsq
Consider the players ordered based on their valuations so that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥
. . . ≥ vn. In order to prove Theorem 7, we distinguish between two cases: i) v1 > v2
and ii) v1 = v2.
Lemma 25 If v1 > v2, the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium, is at
least v2 and at most v1. If we further assume no-overbidding, the maximum bid is
exactly v2.
Proof If v1 > v2, by Lemma 24, the expected utility of player 2 equals 0. From
Lemma 23, the highest bid is at least v2 with probability 1. Moreover, if there
exist players bidding above v1 with positive probability, then at least one of them
(whoever gets the item with positive probability) would have negative utility for
that bid and would prefer to deviate to 0; so, the bidding profile couldn’t be an
equilibrium. Therefore, the maximum bid lies between v1 and v2.
If we further assume no-overbidding, nobody, apart from player 1, would bid
above v2. So, the same hold for player 1, who has an incentive to bid arbitrarily
close to v2. uunionsq
Corollary 2 If v1 > v2, there exists a tie breaking rule, under which the maximum
bid of the worst-case mixed Nash equilibrium is exactly v2.
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Proof Due to Lemma 25, it is sufficient to show a tie breaking rule, where there
exists a mixed Nash equilibrium with highest bid equal to v2. Consider the tie-
breaking rule where, in a case of a tie with player 1 (the bidder of the highest
valuation), the item is always allocated to player 1. Under this tie-breaking rule,
the pure strategy profile, where everybody bids v2 is obviously a pure Nash equi-
librium, with v2 being the maximum bid. uunionsq
Lemma 26 If v1 = v2, the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium, equals
v2.
Proof Consider a set S of k ≥ 2 players having the same valuation v1 = v2 =
. . . = vk = v and the rest having a valuation strictly less than v. For any mixed
Nash equilibrium b ∼ B and any player i, let Gi and Fi be the CDFs of bi and
maxi′ 6=i bi′ , respectively. We define li = inf{x|Gi(x) > 0} to be the infimum value
of player’s i support in B. We would like to prove that maxi li = v. For the sake
of contradiction, assume that maxi li < v (Assumption 1).
We next prove that, under Assumption 1, li = l for any player i ∈ S and
for some 0 ≤ l < v. We will assume that lj < li for some players i, j ∈ S
(Assumption 2) and we will show that Assumption 2 contradicts Assumption 1.
There exists ε > 0 such that lj + ε < li. Moreover, based on the definition of lj ,
for any ε′ > 0, Gj(lj + ε′) > 0 and so Gj(lj + ε) > 0. When player’s j bid is
derived by the interval [lj , lj +ε], she receives the item with zero probability, since
li > lj + ε. Therefore, for any bid of her support that is at most lj + ε, her utility
is zero (Gj(lj + ε) > 0, so there should be such a bid). Since B is a mixed Nash
equilibrium, her total expected utility should also be zero. In that case, Lemma
23 contradicts Assumption 1, and therefore Assumption 2 cannot be true (under
Assumption 1). Thus, for any player i ∈ S, li = l for some 0 ≤ l < v.
Moreover, Lemma 24 indicates that no player i /∈ S bids above l with positive
probability, i.e. Gi(l) = 1 for all i /∈ S. We now show that for any i ∈ S, Gi cannot
have a mass point at l, i.e. Gi(l) = 0 for all i ∈ S.
Case 1. If Gi(l) > 0 for all i, then p =
∏
iGi(l) > 0 is the probability that the
highest bid is l, or more precisely, it is the probability that all players in S bid l and
a tie occurs. Given that this event occurs, there exists a player j ∈ S that gets the
item with probability pj strictly less than 1 (this is the conditional probability).
Therefore, player j has an incentive to deviate from l to l+ε, for ε < (1−pj)(v− l)
(so that pj(v− l) < v− (l+ ε)); this contradicts the fact that B is an equilibrium.
Case 2. If Gi(l) > 0 and Gj(l) = 0 for some i, j ∈ S, then l is in the support of
player i, but she does never receives the item when she bids l, since player j bids
above l with probability 1. Therefore, the expected utility of player i is 0 and due
to Lemma 23 this cannot happen under Assumption 1.
Overall, we have proved so far that, under Assumption 1 (that now has become
l < v), Gi(l) = 0 for all i ∈ S and Gi(l) = 1 for all i /∈ S. Since k ≥ 2, Fi(l) =∏
i′ 6=iGi′(l) = 0 for all i. Consider any player i ∈ S and let ui be her expected
utility. Based on the definition of li, for any ε > 0, there exists x(ε) ∈ [l, l + ε],
such that x(ε) is in the support of player i. Therefore, ui ≤ Fi(x(ε))(v − x(ε)) ≤
Fi(l+ε)(v− l). As Fi is a CDF, it should be right-continuous and so for any δ > 0,
there exists some ε > 0, such that Fi(l + ε)(v − l) < δ and therefore, ui < δ.
We can contradict Assumption 1, right away by using Lemma 23, but we give a
bit more explanation. Assume that, in B, the maximum bid h is strictly less than
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v with probability p > 0. Then, there exists some ε′ > 0, such that h < v − ε′
with probability p. If we consider any δ < p(v − ε′), it is straight forward to see
that player i has an incentive to deviate to the pure strategy v− ε′. Therefore, we
showed that Assumption 1 cannot hold and so the highest bid is at least v with
probability 1. Similar to the proof of Lemma 25, nobody will bid above v in any
mixed Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
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